Courtney, Krishnamoorthi, and Norcross Warn Trump Administration Against Risks of F-35 Sale to Saudi Arabia Amid Expanding Saudi–PRC Military Ties
WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today, Congressman Joe Courtney (CT-02), Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces, partnered with Congressman Raja Krishnamoorthi (IL-08), Ranking Member of the House Select Committee on the Strategic Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist Party, and Congressman Donald Norcross (NJ-01), Ranking Member of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces, today to raise serious national-security concerns regarding President Trump’s proposal to sell F-35 fighter jets to Saudi Arabia. In a letter to Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio, the members warn that the sale could expose some of America’s most sensitive military technology to the People’s Republic of China (PRC), given Beijing’s rapidly expanding security, and digital-infrastructure footprint in Saudi Arabia.
There is clear precedent for blocking access to the F-35 when a partner’s defense relationship with an adversary puts U.S. technology at risk. During his first term, President Trump removed Turkey from the F-35 program after Ankara acquired the Russian-made S-400 air-defense system—despite Turkey being a NATO ally. The members note that this decision underscores the need for “the highest, strictest scrutiny” now, as Saudi Arabia’s military and digital cooperation with the PRC is significantly deeper and more concerning.
The lawmakers write:
“If this deal is completed, Riyadh will gain full access to some of the United States’ most prized, cutting-edge military technology. Given Saudi Arabia’s deepening military ties with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), such a sale has the potential to severely jeopardize U.S. national security if Riyadh were to share any of the F-35’s technology or operational know-how with Beijing.”
They further note:
“As the PRC and Saudi Arabia deepen their security and infrastructure cooperation, we remain skeptical that U.S. military technology will be duly protected… U.S. air supremacy is a zero-sum game and any advantage our adversaries gain on our capabilities… puts that status at risk.”
The members request answers by December 3, 2025, to the following questions:
What consultations with Congress and what interagency process has the Administration undertaken to ensure that security concerns about Saudi Arabia sharing F-35 technology with the PRC, including concerns expressed by the Pentagon’s own intelligence agency, are fully accounted for before finalizing a sale?
To what extent does the Saudi Ministry of Defense use communications and digital services provided by PRC companies, including Huawei and China Telecom, and how does the Administration plan to ensure Beijing is not able to steal sensitive F-35 technology via its significant presence in Saudi Arabia’s digital infrastructure?
What risk do the Departments of Defense and State assess there is that Saudi Arabia could transfer F-35 technology to the PRC in exchange for Beijing’s provision of ballistic missiles and other advanced technology to Riyadh?
Has the Administration requested Saudi Arabia terminate its military and digital cooperation with the PRC as a provision of the United States agreeing to sell it the F-35?
The letter is available here.